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TAKING FLIGHT FROM CAPE TOWN:  INCREASING 
ACCESS TO AIRCRAFT FINANCING 
NETTIE DOWNS* 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The need and demand for world travel has drastically risen 
over the last few decades1 with developed and emerging markets 
alike scrambling to fill it.  One of the largest obstacles has been for 
companies to secure financing for new aircraft.  Following more 
than a decade of research, world experts created the Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment2 (the “Cape Town 
Convention”) and the Protocol to the Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft 
Equipment3 (the “Aircraft Protocol”) in 2001, which have since 
been ratified by sixty4 and fifty-four5 states, respectively.  These 
                                                     
* J.D. 2014, University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.A. 2014, University of 
Pennsylvania Lauder Institute; and Executive Editor of the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law.  I would like to thank my husband and 
parents for their support and encouragement, as well as Professor Charles 
Mooney for offering his guidance and expertise.  Additional thanks is due to the 
Journal of International Law editorial staff for their diligence.   
1 In 2010 alone, global air travel was up nearly eight percent, with regions 
such as China and the Middle East seeing at least twenty percent growth.  Martha 
White, How can America’s Biggest Exporter get Foreign Airlines to buy More Planes? 
And What can the U.S. Government do to Help?, SLATE (Nov. 1, 2010, 10:30 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/business/exports/2010/11/the_boeing_co.html.  
2 Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, 
S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10 (2003), 2307 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter Cape Town 
Convention]. 
3 Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment 
on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, Nov. 16, 2001, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-
10 (2003) [hereinafter Aircraft Protocol]. 
4 Status of the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment, 
UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown [hereinafter 
UNIDROIT Status of the Convention]. 
5 Status of the Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment, UNIDROIT, http:// 
www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown-aircraft (last visited Apr. 29, 2014) 
[hereinafter UNIDROIT Status of the Protocol]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
05_DOWNS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  2:41 AM 
864 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:3 
two treaties established an asset-based international registry, 
whereby all international security interests in an aircraft can be 
registered if the debtor is situated in a member state.6  This registry 
also has the benefit of establishing international priority in an 
aircraft.7  The Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol also 
provide for basic remedies and enforcement and stipulate which 
country’s laws would apply in cases of default.8  All of these 
factors lead to more transparency in the industry, which, in theory, 
will make financing much easier to secure. 
In this Comment, I argue that the Cape Town Convention and 
Aircraft Protocol, as they continue to be implemented, are 
increasing access to capital and lowering the cost of aircraft 
financing around the world, but with the largest and most positive 
impact centered on emerging markets, such as the United Arab 
Emirates.  This lower cost of debt is increasing countries’ capability 
to expand their fleet size and is thereby boosting manufacturer’s 
sales as well.  The two treaties are therefore fulfilling their purpose, 
but still need to be promoted and implemented in non-member 
states. 
This Comment is organized into several sections to explain 
how the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol are 
changing the environment for aircraft finance.  Section 2 describes 
the aircraft finance climate leading up to the creation of the two 
treaties, particularly outlining the structural and legal barriers to 
cost-effective finance options, and how the Cape Town Convention 
and Aircraft Protocol sought to remedy those problems.  Section 3 
discusses various incentives that states and institutions 
implemented to entice more states to sign the treaties.  Section 4 
briefly explores the global quantitative and qualitative effects of 
the treaty as a whole and then presents a case study of how the 
Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol have affected the 
ability of key players in the United Arab Emirates to secure aircraft 
financing.  Finally, concluding remarks will discuss the overall 
effects of the two treaties. 
2. LEADING UP TO CAPE TOWN 
                                                     
6 See Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 16; Aircraft Protocol, supra 
note 3, at ch. 3. 
7 Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 29. 
8 Id. at art. 8–15. 
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2.1. Economic Issues 
Aircraft are extremely expensive and thus very difficult to 
finance.  Boeing and Airbus jets range from around $70 million to 
$400 million9 with a median price of about $200 million per plane.   
During the 1980s and 1990s, not only was the price of a plane, let 
alone a whole fleet of aircraft, nearly prohibitive, but the fact that 
aircraft are mobile and move throughout many jurisdictions made 
it very difficult to determine the rights of debtors and creditors at 
any one time, presenting extra risks to potential lenders.10 
One way for lenders to mitigate their risk exposure is through 
asset-based financing and obtaining a priority security interest. 
Asset-based lending differs from traditional bank loans in that the 
lender is less concerned about the borrower’s historical cash flows 
and is more concerned about the debtor’s borrowing base assets 
and what assets will be securing the loan.  A security interest in the 
assets is a type of property interest that gives the holder of the 
interest certain preferential rights regarding the disposition of the 
secured assets. 
Asset-based lending arrangements encourage creditors to offer 
more capital than other arrangements.  Evidence of this comes 
from the vast swell of loaned capital in the 1950s, which followed 
the enactment of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.11  
Highly secured transactions arguably increase the level of credit to 
the private sector from about thirty percent of GDP to sixty percent 
of GDP12 and decrease the cost of credit, with borrowers in 
                                                     
9 See Commercial Airplanes: Jet Prices, BOEING, 
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/prices/index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 
2013) (listing the average Boeing jet prices); Press Release, Airbus, New Airbus 
Aircraft List Prices for 2013 (Jan. 17, 2013), available at http://www. 
airbus.com/presscentre/pressreleases/press-release-detail/detail/new-airbus-
aircraft-list-prices-for-2013/ (listing the average Airbus jet prices). 
10 See Colin Thaine, Security Interests in Aircraft and Spare Parts I: England and 
Wales, 15 INT’L BUS. LAW. 167, 169 (1987) (“The possibility of a financier’s security 
interest being completely ignored by the courts of a jurisdiction where the aircraft 
happens to be when the security interest becomes enforceable is a spectre to haunt 
lenders, while the fact that there will be claims . . . which will take priority over 
the security interest is to be accepted with resignation.”). 
11 Mark J. Sundahl, The “Cape Town Approach”: A New Method of Making 
International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 339, 345 (2006) (crediting Article 9 as 
a major reason for the American post-war boom). 
12 Mehnaz Safavian, Heywood Fleisig & Jevgenijs Steinbuks, Unlocking Dead 
Capital: How Reforming Collateral Laws Improves Access to Finance, VIEWPOINT: PUB. 
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industrial countries qualifying for nine times the amount of credit 
as their counterparts without collateral.13  Furthermore, experts 
recognize these benefits particularly in the aircraft industry as 
evidenced by the fact that the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development’s (“OECD”) most recent Aircraft 
Sector Understanding only allows member states’ credit agencies 
to provide export credits for non-asset backed transactions if they 
charge a higher minimum surcharge and, in the case of non-
sovereign transactions, if they cap the value of official support to 
$15 million.14 
Despite the recognized benefits of asset-based lending, many 
developing countries still do not have an asset-based finance 
framework, making it difficult for new and existing airlines to 
obtain capital unless they can secure a sovereign guarantee.  
Sovereign guarantees, however, are also problematic because 
many developing nations do not have good credit scores and thus 
any loans the airlines can get would still be very expensive.15  Not 
only that, but having the domestic government back low-credit 
airlines, lowers the overall credit rating of the country’s 
government16 leading to other economic issues. 
                                                     
POL’Y FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR, Mar. 2006, at 1, 3 fig.4 available at 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11190/360790
Viewpoin1an1Fleisig1Steinbuks.pdf?sequence=1. 
13 Alejandro Alvarez de la Campa, Increasing Access to Credit Through 
Reforming Secured Transactions in the MENA Region 6 (The World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper No. 5613, Mar. 2011), available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2011/03/24
/000158349_20110324112706/Rendered/PDF/WPS5613.pdf. 
14 OECD, Sector Understanding on Export Credits for Civil Aircraft, 
TAD/ASU(2011)1, at 33–34 (Sept. 1, 2011). 
15 See Anthony Saunders, Anand Srinivasan, Ingo Walter & Jeffrey Wool, The 
Economic Implications of International Secured Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study, 
20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 309, 335 n.78 (1999) (noting that “even direct sovereign 
credit support of such airlines, is no assurance of low-cost financing”). 
16 See Anthony Saunders, Anand Srinivasan & Ingo Walter, Innovation in 
International Law and Global Finance: Estimating the Financial Impact of the 
Cape Town Convention 31–32 (Mar. 29, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=894027 (commenting on 
the Cape Town Convention’s spillover benefits to governments whose balance 
sheets had previously been burdened with sovereign guarantees to domestic 
airlines).  See also Lorne S. Clark, The 2001 Cape Town Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment and Aircraft Equipment Protocol: Internationalising 
Asset-Based Financing Principles for the Acquisition of Aircraft and Engines, 69 J. AIR L. 
& COM. 3, 17 (2004) (discussing how the Cape Town Convention is a “win-win” 
 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss3/5
05_DOWNS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2014  2:41 AM 
2014] INCREASING ACCESS TO AIRCRAFT FINANCING 867 
Furthermore, even in countries which permit asset-based 
lending, it has historically been difficult for creditors of new loans 
to determine whether or not other creditors already had a security 
interest in a given aircraft.  The Chicago Convention of 1944 sought 
to mitigate this problem by requiring all its signatory states to 
establish some form of national registration system for aircraft.17  
However, these national registries were not always well 
maintained nor did they readily provide lenders with access to all 
the information they would need in one location.  The U.K. Aircraft 
National Registry, for instance, only maintained a record “of 
aircraft nationality and not of title to or rights over an aircraft and 
furthermore [was] not open to public inspection” meaning that a 
creditor in a conditional sale transaction could be unprotected if a 
third party purchaser was able to rely on the English law principle 
of nemo dat quod non habet.18  The national registration systems’ lack 
of accessibility led to increased transaction costs for lenders who 
could not be sure of superior claims to an aircraft. 
The climate of the late 1980s and through the 1990s was one of 
both adequate supply and increased demand for new aircraft, but 
there was not sufficient access to cheap capital to exploit such 
favorable market conditions.  Manufacturers generally prefer not 
to lease their own aircraft,19 and since buyers and potential lessors 
did not have the desired funding, airlines weren’t able to obtain as 
many new aircraft as they desired.  This upset manufacturers who 
felt the need to recoup their R&D costs from having just developed 
                                                     
scenario for airlines, manufacturers, financial institutions, governments, and 
passengers). 
17 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 16–21, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 
1180. 
18 Thaine, supra note 10, at 171.  Nemo dat quod non habet means ‘no one can 
give that which he does not have’ and in practice prohibits an aircraft purchaser 
from acquiring title from someone who did not himself have title. 
19 Interview with Max Horsley, former Boeing financial analyst, in Phila., Pa. 
(Nov. 13, 2012).  Although manufacturers prefer to not lease their planes, as 
planes sales contribute to liquidity more than plane leases, many manufacturers 
do maintain leasing and financing arms.  For instance Boeing’s subsidiary Boeing 
Capital has a portfolio of approximately $4.1 billion comprised of 270 commercial 
planes. Aircraft Financial Services, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/bcc/sitemap/ 
af.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).  This $4.1 billion portfolio is dwarfed, however, 
by Boeing’s $52.9 billion revenues from commercial airplane sales for fiscal year 
2013.  Boeing Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 17 (Feb. 14, 2014). 
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newer, bigger, more fuel efficient planes.20  There was 
consequently a huge push from manufacturers to find a solution to 
this capital shortage.21 
2.2. Legal Issues 
Many national legal regimes were and remain inadequate to 
support secure, asset-based financing, prohibiting some 
transactions and causing others to be much more expensive.22  A 
recent World Bank study reports that less than fifty percent of 
private entities in the developing world have any access to credit, 
let alone sufficient credit.23  To support the requirements of 
modern finance, countries must structurally allow for: 
(1) a non-possessory security interest, (2) clear priority rules 
coupled with a public registration system to establish 
priority, (3) prompt enforcement measures for the creditor 
marked by the ability of the creditor to take possession of 
and sell the collateral upon the debtor’s default without a 
court order, and (4) the ability of a secured creditor to 
enforce a security interest despite the debtor’s bankruptcy.24 
Even countries that are generally thought to have good legal 
systems fell short of the requisite system for secured transactions.25  
For instance, Germany, like the United Kingdom, did not have a 
public registry that both provided notice and established priority.26  
Another shortcoming is evident in Bolivia’s registry, which is 
chronological and thus requires a potential creditor to search the 
entire registry to discover any superior claims.27  India also fails to 
                                                     
20 Sundahl, supra note 11, at 350–51 (referencing the new Boeing 787 
Dreamliner and Airbus A380). 
21 Id. 
22 Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Introduction to the Cape Town Convention and 
the Aircraft Protocol: (One or Two Class Module for Law School Courses on 
International Business Transactions or International Financial Law) 12 (2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
23 Alvarez de la Campa, supra note 13, at 5. 
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meet all of the requirements because it effectively requires a court 
order for repossession, which can be a lengthy process and nullify 
any value of a security interest.28 
These problems were often not rectified due to the inexperience 
of local lawyers, scholars, and others who might otherwise have 
the capacity to bring about legal reform in their home countries 
regarding global transactions.29  One potential solution to that 
problem could be to emulate the securities laws of another 
country.30  However, that is much easier said than done as it does 
not take into consideration the unique circumstances of the host 
country or that the borrowed law may itself be in need of 
amendment.31  Due to all of these discrepancies in securities laws 
and the lack of clear solutions, a study performed by the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) 
recommended that UNCITRAL “consider the necessity . . . of 
framing rules in this field on an international level, especially for 
the international movement of goods subject to security 
interests.”32  
The UNCITRAL study characterized the vast discrepancies in 
law as the “most prevalent problem” regarding security interests.33   
It further noted that most securities statutes were adopted prior to 
World War II and were consequently “not well suited to current 
                                                     
27 Heywood Fleisig, The Power of Collateral, VIEWPOINT: PUB. POL’Y FOR THE 
PRIVATE SECTOR, THE WORLD BANK, April 1995, at 1, 1, available at 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11674/multi0
page.pdf?sequence=1. 
28 See Sundahl, supra note 11, at 346 (noting India’s lack of key elements that 
are needed for modern secured transaction law). 
29 See Sandeep Gopalan, Securing Mobile Assets: The Cape Town Convention and 
Its Aircraft Protocol, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 61, 64 (2003) (recognizing 
lawyers’ and scholars’ inexperience with open-market transactions as a barrier to 
reform). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 64–65. 
32 Report of the Secretary-General: Study on Security Interests, [1977] 8 Y.B. Int’l 
Trade L. Comm’n 173, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/131.  It should be noted that Drobnig 
was describing securities laws as a whole and in fact made several exclusions 
from his study (including aircraft) to limit the scope of his research.  Id.  That 
being said, this study is still useful as it is informative of the general securities’ 
market climate of the time.  
33 Ronald C.C. Cuming, International Regulation of Aspects of Security Interests 
in Mobile Equipment, 1 UNIF. L. REV. 63, 125 (1990). 
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patterns of trade and finance.”34  The obscure, slow, and expensive 
processes that most creditors would have to go through in case of 
default drastically impeded creditors’ ability to efficiently resolve 
any disputes regarding recognition or enforcement of security 
interests,35 leading to creditor uncertainty and high information 
costs. 
In addition to the registration and priority issues, creditors also 
struggled to know what law would control their security interests 
at any given time, given the fact that aircraft are mobile.  The 
traditional approach to such a problem was to apply the law of the 
lex situs, or the law of the location where the security interest was 
first created.36  However, the lex situs approach is problematic 
when applied to mobile equipment because the location where the 
security interest was created is often “casual or fortuitous” and it is 
“only a matter of chance that the security interest . . . will be given 
sufficient recognition in [a] new situs.”37  The Geneva Convention 
on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft solved this 
problem for its member states by deeming the country of 
registration as to nationality as the permanent situs of an aircraft.38   
However, it should be noted that “both the country where the 
aircraft is registered and the country where the owner or financier 
is enforcing its rights must be parties to the Convention before 
there is any benefit.”39  There are currently eighty-nine countries 
that benefit from this rule by being party to the Geneva 
Convention.40 
These risks regarding priority, notice, and enforceability made 
creditors less willing to offer financing for expensive mobile 
equipment, such as aircraft, than they otherwise would have been 
if the securities laws were more favorable and transparent.  Despite 
the great need for unification, in 1980 UNCITRAL concluded that 
                                                     
34 Id.  
35 See Gopalan, supra note 29, at 62 (discussing the results of a survey of 
national securities laws). 
36 Thaine, supra note 10, at 168.  
37 Cuming, supra note 33, at 141. 
38 Convention on the International Recognition of Rights in Aircraft art. II(2), 
June 19, 1948, 4 U.S.T. 1830, T.I.A.S. No. 2847. 
39 Thaine, supra note 10, at 168. 
40 For a list of member states, see the depositary’s website at 
http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Geneva_EN.pdf. 
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the area of law was too complex and that unification “was in all 
likelihood unattainable. . . . [and] that no further work should at 
present be carried out . . . and that the [issue] should no longer be 
accorded priority.”41 
2.3. Solutions 
Almost a decade later, most countries still had not reformed 
their domestic securities laws and the aforementioned economic 
and legal problems persisted.  Following the 1988 International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) 
conference regarding the UNIDROIT Conventions on International 
Financial Leasing42 and International Factoring,43 UNIDROIT 
authorized Professor Ronald Cuming of the University of 
Saskatchewan to investigate the commercial need for a multilateral 
treaty regarding secured transactions in movable property.44  The 
scope of the study was limited to movable equipment because 
movable equipment is not widely held by consumers or small 
businesses, and thus any potential treaty could avoid contending 
with public policy issues.45  Moreover, there was a greater need for 
laws regulating movable equipment because very high value 
equipment (such as aircraft, train cars, etc.) is often moved across 
international borders, creating the aforementioned impediments to 
creditors having their rights recognized and enforced.46  It was also 
widely believed that a more encompassing treaty would likely fail 
due to competing interests.47  Cuming’s study, as well as a 
subsequent Working Group Report, indicated there was an 
                                                     
41 See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the 
Work of Its Thirteenth Session, [1980] 11 Y.B. Int’l Trade L. Comm’n 10-11, U.N. Doc. 
A/35/17. 
42 For the complete text, see UNIDROIT Convention on International 
Financial Leasing, May, 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 931. 
43 For the complete text, see UNIDROIT Convention on International 
Factoring, May, 28, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 943. 
44 Cuming, supra note 33, at 63–67. 
45 See Sundahl, supra note 11, at 349 (noting the enforcement of security 
interests against “vulnerable parties”—i.e. consumers and small business—as a 
contentious public policy issue).  Sundahl notes that “broad public policy issues 
continue[d] to pose diplomatic challenges to the adoption of the Cape Town 
Convention, particularly with respect to space assets.” Id. at n.35. 
46 Id. at 349. 
47 Cuming, supra note 33, at 69. 
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immediate need for the unification of law and that such a 
convention would be feasible.48  Although some scholarly work has 
suggested that the principal goal of this Convention was to further 
solve the lex situs issue,49 a more scrutinizing look at the then 
current economic environment and the absence of adequate legal 
reform suggests that the Convention was in fact an attempt by the 
international arena to reform domestic securities and bankruptcy 
laws, regarding certain large-scale movable goods, that countries 
were not reforming on their own. 
Over the course of a decade, negotiations stalled regarding 
some types of mobile equipment;50 however, UNIDRIOT allowed 
the aircraft industry to forge onward independent of other 
industries.  Thus the Cape Town Convention acts as an umbrella 
agreement which only comes into force as separate, but related, 
agreements are reached regarding each type of mobile equipment.  
The Cape Town Convention and each Protocol should be 
interpreted as a single instrument, with the Protocols controlling in 
the event of any inconsistencies.51  The Aircraft Protocol was the 
first of the protocols to be signed52 and has since been followed by 
the Luxembourg Protocol to the Convention on International 
Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters specific to Railway 
Rolling Stock53 in 2007 and the Protocol to the Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to 
Space Assets in 2012.54 
                                                     
48 Id. at 185–91; Sundahl, supra note 11, at 348–49. 
49 See generally Gopalan, supra note 29, at 61–64; Angie Boliver, Comment, 
Square Pegs in a Round Hole? The Effects of the 2006 Cape Town Treaty Implementation 
and its Impact on Fractional Jet Ownership, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 529, 532–533 (2007) 
(describing the lex situs issue and how the Cape Town Convention was meant to 
rectify it). 
50 Sundahl, supra note 11, at 350. 
51 See Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 6 (“To the extent of any 
inconsistency between this Convention and the Protocol, the Protocol shall 
prevail.”). 
52 The Aircraft Protocol was signed November 16, 2001, while the Rail 
Protocol and Space Protocol were signed February 23, 2007 and March 9, 2012, 
respectively. 
53 For full text, see Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in 
Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Railway Rolling Stock, opened for 
signature Feb. 23, 2007, available at http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/ 
security-interests/rail-protocol.  The Rail Protocol has not yet entered into force. 
54 For full text, see Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in 
Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Space Assets, opened for signature Mar. 9, 
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The planning of the Cape Town Convention was unique not 
only because it allowed each industry (aircraft, rail, and space) to 
tailor international law to its specific needs, but also because 
diplomats and policy leaders actively engaged key industry 
participants.  The International Air Transport Association 
(“IATA”), an international trade group of about 240 airlines;55 the 
Aviation Workers Group (“AWG”), a conglomeration of aviation 
manufacturers, lessors, and financiers, including Boeing and 
Airbus; and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(“ICAO”), a United Nations agency that aids in the development of 
international air transport, all participated in the Cape Town 
Convention negotiations.56 
Through these extensive negotiations, the delegates sought to 
enhance economic benefits for all parties involved.  Their method 
can be divided into four separate goals, namely to 1) infuse 
consistency and predictability into aircraft sales by creating 
uniform rules to govern creditors and debtors in contracting states, 
2) create greater certainty that, upon default, creditors can swiftly 
exercise their remedies, 3) allow for more party autonomy, and 4) 
ensure that the treaty would be fully implemented. 
2.3.1. Consistency and Predictability 
To provide consistency and predictability to creditor claims, 
the Cape Town Convention created an International Registry 
wherein creditors can register all whole and fractional 
“international interests,” “prospective international interests,” and 
“registrable non-consensual rights and interests”57 in aircraft.58  
These registrations are organized by manufacturer name, model, 
and serial number,59 essentially creating an asset-based registration 
                                                     
2012, available at http://www.unidroit.org/instruments/security-interests/space-
protocol.  The Space Protocol has not yet entered into force. 
55 Fact Sheet: IATA – International Air Transport Association, IATA, 
http://www.iata.org/pressroom/facts_figures/fact_sheets/Pages/iata.aspx (last 
updated Dec. 2013). 
56 Sundahl, supra note 11, at 350–54 (describing the entities that took part in 
the Convention negotiations). 
57 Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 16(1)(a). 
58 Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, at art. III (incorporating the “interests” 
listed in the Cape Town Convention into the Aircraft Protocol). 
59 Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, at art. VII (listing which characteristics of 
the aircraft must be described for registration purposes). 
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to mirror the asset-based financing of aircraft.  Asset-based 
registration is a novel concept for many countries of the world 
which often register security interests either chronologically60 or by 
debtor name.61  Priority is established on a first to file basis.62  This 
International Registry, although physically located in Ireland, is 
fully automated online and searchable by the public twenty-four 
hours a day, seven days a week.63  The Cape Town Convention 
also provides predictability for debtors and lessees who are 
guaranteed quiet possession of the aircraft in the absence of 
default.64 
2.3.2. Risk Mitigation Through Default Remedies 
Additionally, the Cape Town Convention addresses risks of 
loss that creditors used to face by affirming that a creditor, subject 
to agreement by the debtor and any declaration made by a 
Contracting State, has four remedies upon default:  repossession, 
sale or lease of the aircraft, collection of income or profits related to 
the aircraft,65 and de-registration and export of the aircraft.66  A 
creditor may even use self-help to repossess an aircraft without a 
court order, as long as it is not contrary to local law and the 
Contracting State did not pronounce in its declarations that non-
judicially mandated self-help is unavailable.67  Furthermore, if the 
                                                     
60 See Fleisig, supra note 27, at 2 (noting Bolivia as one country which registers 
security interests chronologically). 
61 U.C.C. § 9-519(c) (indicating that registration can be by debtor name). 
62 Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 29. 
63 The International Registry of Mobile Assets can be accessed at 
https://www.internationalregistry.aero/irWeb/. 
64 Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, at art. XVI. 
65  Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 8.  
66 Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, at art. IX. 
67 LEGAL ADVISORY PANEL OF THE AVIATION WORKING GRP., PRACTITIONER’S 




nvention%20and%20the%20Aircraft%20Protocol.pdf (postulating on the legality 
of various acts under the CTC).  It is unlikely that a creditor would use self-help to 
repossess an aircraft as it is often logistically very difficult to fly away with a 
debtor’s plane, however it is not unheard of.  See generally Stephen Joiner, Grab the 
Airplane and Go, AIR & SPACE MAG., May 2010, http://www.airspacemag.com/ 
history-of-flight/Grab-the-Airplane-and-Go.html. 
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creditor is required to go to court, the Cape Town Convention 
ensures it that it can obtain “speedy relief” from the court, pending 
final determination of its claim.68  Not only does the Cape Town 
Convention provide effective remedies for creditors, but it also 
protects the debtor by ensuring the debtor’s quiet possession of the 
aircraft absent default69 and by making some default provisions 
mandatory, such as allowing the debtor to discharge the security 
interest by paying in full after default and before the sale of the 
aircraft by the creditor.70 
2.3.3. Provide for Party Autonomy 
Although the Cape Town Convention somewhat limits party 
autonomy through the imposition of a few mandatory rules 
governing instances of payment default,71 it is generally malleable 
and permits parties to treat its provisions as default provisions that 
can be contracted around.  For example, Article VIII(3) of the 
Aircraft Protocol prescribes as a default that the parties’ contract 
will be governed by the law of the designated State, while Article 
VIII(2) permits parties to stipulate a different choice of law for their 
contract.72  The AWG asserts that this choice of law freedom has 
already proven useful and has been “used in Mexican proceedings 
to support assertions as to the governing law in filed litigation 
papers.”73  Additionally, the Cape Town Convention allows parties 
to agree as to what constitutes a default74 and to any other type of 
remedy permitted by applicable law, as long as it is not 
inconsistent with any of the mandatory provisions of the 
                                                     
68 Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 13. 
69 See Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, at art. XVI(1).  See also Colin L. Powell, 
Letter of Submittal, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108-10, at 15–16 (2003) (“Recognition of 
quiet possession rights, absent the Protocol, are less certain in some jurisdictions, 
and are important for airline and other users.”). 
70 Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 9(4).  For the full range of 
mandatory default requirements, with only a few exceptions as listed in the 
Aircraft Protocol at art. 8(3), see Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 15.  
71 See id. 
72 Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, at art. VIII. 
73 LEGAL ADVISORY PANEL OF THE AVIATION WORKING GRP., supra note 67, at 
107.  
74 Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at art. 11. 
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Convention.75  This autonomy is an important facet of the Cape 
Town Convention as it empowers creditors by permitting them to 
mitigate their risks and thereby freeing them to offer more capital. 
2.3.4. Ensure Implementation of the Treaties 
For the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol to 
positively influence the aviation market, they need to be fully 
implemented.  In many countries, treaties take “direct effect” in 
that country upon ratification, although some countries require 
independent legislation to “incorporate” treaties into their national 
law.76  The AWG, one of the key industry participants in the Cape 
Town Convention negotiations, asserts that the treaties must “(1) 
have the force of law in the Contracting States (i.e. a national court 
would be compelled to apply the Cape Town Convention), and (2) 
have priority over or supersede any conflicting law in such 
Contracting States.”77  The Cape Town Convention represents part 
of a new shift in international law to create treaties that govern 
individual parties’ rights vis a vis other foreign individual parties, 
as opposed to nations rights against other nations.78  This shift is 
important to note as it accentuates the need for full 
implementation.  In order for creditors to have more consistency, 
predictability, and clarity of their rights, they depend on their 
rights being fully enforceable in each Member State, meaning that 
the other goals of the Cape Town Convention and Protocols cannot 
be achieved unless each State takes all necessary steps to fully 
implement the treaties. 
3. INCENTIVES TO SIGN 
The Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol were signed 
in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks,79 which 
                                                     
75 Id. at art. 12.  The Official Commentary of the Cape Town Convention 
provides more detail as to what form these additional remedies may take, such as: 
breach of contract damages, interest, specific performance, etc.  See generally SIR 
ROY GOODE, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN MOBILE EQUIPMENT AND 
PROTOCOL THERETO ON MATTERS SPECIFIC TO AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT: OFFICIAL 
COMMENTARY (rev. ed. 2008). 
76 LEGAL ADVISORY PANEL OF THE AVIATION WORKING GRP., supra note 67, at 47. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 Cape Town Convention, supra note 2 (signed November 16, 2001); Aircraft 
Protocol, supra note 3 (signed November 16, 2001). 
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devastated the aviation industry emotionally, publicly, and 
monetarily.  Aircraft orders were significantly down until about 
2005.80 
3.1. Monetary Incentives 
Perhaps partially in response to a Boeing lobby of the U.S. 
government to stimulate their depressed growth and more 
importantly due to the perceived economic benefits of the 
ratification of the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol81, 
the U.S. Export-Import Bank announced in 2003 that it would offer 
a one-third reduction of its exposure fee for foreign buyers of U.S. 
commercial aircraft who were subject to the Cape Town 
Convention, pushing the minimum exposure fee as low as two 
percent.82  This exposure fee reduction was repeatedly renewed 
through 2010,83 and many airlines, particularly in developing 
                                                     
80 Custom reports showing Boeing aircraft orders can be created and 
downloaded from http://active.boeing.com/commercial/orders/index.cfm? 
content=userdefinedselection.cfm&pageid=m15527. 
81 Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank 
Extends Offer of Reduced Exposure Fee Through December 2010 for Buyers in 
Countries Implementing the Cape Town Treaty (Sept. 27, 2007), available at 
http://www.exim.gov/newsandevents/releases/2007/ex-im-bank-extends-offer-
of-reduced-exposure-fee-through-december-2010-for-buyers-in-countries-
implementing-the-cape.cfm (quoting the Ex-Im Bank Chairman and President as 
saying, “By extending our offer to reduce our exposure fee through 2010, Ex-Im 
Bank is reaffirming our commitment to the Cape Town Treaty.  We firmly believe 
that this treaty and the international registry will result in greater predictability 
for aircraft financiers by significantly reducing the legal risks associated with 
cross-border, asset-backed aircraft financings and leases,” and the Ex-Im Bank 
Vice President of Transportation as saying, “The Cape Town Treaty will expand 
sources of aircraft financing, increase the amount of financing and lower the cost 
for airlines.  In turn, the lower financing cost will help airlines expand their fleets 
and buy more new aircraft, thereby supporting jobs in the aerospace industry”). 
82 Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank Offers 
One-Third Reduction on its Exposure Fee on Export Financing for U.S. Large 




83 Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank 
Renews Offer of One-Third Exposure Fee Reduction on Export Financing of U.S. 
Large Commercial Aircraft (Aug. 20, 2004), available at http://www.exim.gov/ 
newsandevents/releases/2006andprior/2004/ex-im-bank-renews-offer-of-one-
third-exposure-fee-reduction-on-export-financing-of-u-s-large-commercial-
aircraft.cfm; Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank 
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countries, took advantage of it.84  The U.S. Export-Import Bank 
eventually exchanged its self-assessed rate reduction for the 
Aircraft Sector Understandings (“ASU”) of 2007 and 2011 which 
act as “gentlemen’s agreements” among the OECD countries and 
stipulate the most favorable financial terms that an official export 
credit agency can offer.85  The recent 2011 ASU permits export 
credit agencies to provide up to a ten percent discount from the 
applicable premium rate for qualifying Cape Town Convention 
                                                     
Extends Favorable Financing of Major Aviation Purchases to Buyers in Countries 
Implementing Cape Town Treaty (Jul. 14, 2005), available at 
http://www.exim.gov/newsandevents/releases/2006andprior/2005/ex-im-
bank-extends-favorable-financing-of-major-aviation-purchases-to-buyers-in-
countries-implementing-cape-town-treaty.cfm; Press Release, Export-Import Bank 
of the United States, Ex-Im Bank Extends Offer of Reduced Exposure Fee Through 
March 2007 for Buyers in Countries Implementing the Cape Town Treaty (Sept. 7, 
2006), available at http://www.exim.gov/newsandevents/releases/2006andprior/ 
2006/ex-im-bank-extends-offer-of-reduced-exposure-fee-through-march-2007-for-
buyers-in-countries-implementing-the-cape-town.cfm; Press Release, Export-
Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank Extends Offer of Reduced Exposure 
Fee Through September 2007 for Buyers in Countries Implementing the Cape 
Town Treaty (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://www.exim.gov/newsandevents/ 
releases/2007/ex-im-bank-extends-offer-of-reduced-exposure-fee-through-
september-2007-for-buyers-in-countries-implementing-the-cape.cfm; Press 
Release (Sept. 27, 2007), supra note 81. 
84 See Press Release, Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank 
Approves Over $1 Billion to Support Exports of Boeing 737-900ER Aircraft to 
Indonesia’s Lion Air (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.exim. 
gov/newsandevents/ 
releases/2009/ex-im-bank-approves-over-1-billion-to-support-exports-of-boeing-
737-900er-aircraft-to-indonesias-lion-air.cfm (noting that eight countries, as of 
April 3, 2009, had taken advantage of the reduced exposure fee offered to 
countries who have ratified and implemented the Convention, including Angola, 
Ethiopia, Indonesia, Kenya, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, and Senegal); Press Release, 
Export-Import Bank of the United States, Ex-Im Bank Supports Aerospace Exports 
to Ethiopian Airlines, Signer of Cape Town Treaty (Dec. 16, 2003), available at  
http://www.exim.gov/newsandevents/releases/2006andprior/2003/ex-im-
bank-supports-aerospace-exports-to-ethiopian-airlines-signer-of-capetown-treaty-
espa-ol.cfm (announcing Ethiopian Airlines as the second country to ratify the 
Cape town Convention and the first country to take advantage of the reduced 
exposure fee). 
85 See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., SECTOR UNDERSTANDING 
ON EXPORT CREDITS FOR CIVIL AIRCRAFT 1 (2011) [hereinafter ASU].  See also Angel 
Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, Remarks at the Signing of the ASU 2007 in Rio 
de Janeiro (Jul. 30, 2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/fr/general/ 
aircraftsectorunderstandingonexportcreditsforcivilaircraft-
remarksmadebyangelgurriaduringthesigningceremonyinbrazil.htm (commenting 
on the significance and purpose of the new ASU). 
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Member States.86  This discount rate provides a greater benefit to 
countries with low credit ratings as opposed to high credit ratings 
by a spread of about two percent in upfront costs.87 
3.2. Socio-political Incentives 
The AWG continues to promote the ratification and 
implementation of the Cape Town Convention around the world.  
In this regard, the AWG currently provides funding to the Cape 
Town Convention Academic Project, a joint collaboration between 
Oxford University and the University of Washington, intended to 
assess the benefits of the Cape Town Convention and enhance the 
understanding and implementation of it.88  The AWG also works in 
collaboration with other entities to host seminars on understanding 
and implementing the Cape Town Convention in the host 
country.89  To the extent that the AWG or this Academic Project 
have political influence, they will likely influence other countries.   
Furthermore, as more countries sign the Cape Town 
Convention and Aircraft Protocol, other countries may experience 
peer pressure to sign as well.  Additionally, aircraft manufacturers 
and financiers actively participated in the creation of the Cape 
Town Convention and support it.90  Acquiescing to the terms 
partially negotiated by manufacturers and financiers will assuredly 
enhance purchasers’ and governments’ relationships with those 
parties.  Furthermore, as one of the United States’ largest exporters, 
Boeing enjoys a degree of influence within the U.S. Export-Import 
Bank, which provides loans and guarantees for a variety of U.S. 
exports.91  This influence, although limited and indirect may, given 
the right circumstances, influence the Export-Import Bank’s 
                                                     
86 ASU, supra note 85, at 30. 
87 AVIATION WORKING GRP., EXPLANATORY POWERPOINT: 2011 AIRCRAFT SECTOR 
Understanding – OVERVIEW AND SUMMARY 9, available at 
http://www.awg.aero/projects/exportcreditrules/.  
88 Cape Town Convention Academic Project, AVIATION WORKING GRP., 
http://www.awg.aero/projects/capetownconvention (last visited Jan. 31, 2013).  
89 Upcoming and Recent Cape Town Convention Events, AVIATION WORKING 
GRP., http://www.awg.aero/projects/capetownconvention (last visited Jan. 31, 
2013). 
90 See Sundahl, supra note 11, at 350-54. 
91 See About Us, EXPORT IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.exim.gov/about/whatwedo/keyindustries/index.cfm (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2014). 
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decision to make a loan to another country or the terms of a loan.  
The Export-Import Bank and its counterpart export credit agencies 
in other countries play a pivotal role in aircraft finance.  Notably, 
during the recent recession and debt crisis, export credit agencies 
“increased their support for new aircraft from approximately 15–20 
percent of total deliveries to 30–40 percent.”92  Ratifying the Cape 
Town Convention may help countries promote more business and 
a better relationship with foreign export credit agencies. 
4. EFFECTS OF THE CAPE TOWN CONVENTION AND AIRCRAFT 
PROTOCOL 
4.1. General Effects 
Both Boeing and Airbus’ current market outlooks for the period 
of 2013–2032 foresee about a five percent annual growth at a cost of 
over $4 trillion, up from previous projections.93  Airbus’ outlook 
particularly acknowledged that emerging markets would represent 
fifty percent of new aircraft demand over the next twenty years.94  
Consequently, emerging markets are also the markets most in need 
of low-cost financing.  As emerging markets acknowledge their 
own internal demand and realize that their own legal institutions 
are inadequate to support such demand, they seem to be ratifying 
the Convention at an increasing rate.95 
Even though the Cape Town Convention is still relatively 
young, some form of its financial impact should be observable 
because “[f]inancial markets tend to be highly sensitive to 
regulatory changes.”96  A few professors have attempted to model 
the financial impact of the Cape Town Convention.  It should be 
                                                     
92 Dean N. Gerber, The 2011 Aircraft Sector Understanding: Calming the 
Turbulent Skies, 24 AIR & SPACE  LAW 1, 1 (2011). 
93 JOHN LEAHY, AIRBUS, GLOBAL MARKET FORECAST 2013-2032, at 2, 13 (2013), 
available at http://www.airbus.com/company/market/forecast/?eID=dam_ 
frontend_push&docID=33621; Current Market Outlook 2013-2032, BOEING, 
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/cmo/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2014). 
94 Leahy, supra note 93, at 8. 
95 Within the last two years alone, Bahrain, Belarus, Brazil, Canada, Congo, 
Fiji, Kuwait, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Myanmar, Togo, and Ukraine 
have all ratified the Aircraft Protocol and Cape Town Convention.  See 
UNIDROIT Status of the Convention, supra note 4; UNIDROIT Status of the 
Protocol, supra note 5.  
96 Saunders et al., supra note 16, at 2. 
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noted that a quantitative financial impact analysis is complicated 
by the confidential nature of most financial transactions and that it 
is additionally difficult to establish a direct causation to any one 
thing, such as the Cape Town Convention, due to the complex 
structure of capital markets.  Nonetheless, Professors Saunders, 
Srinivasan, and Walter attempted a financial impact analysis using 
standard interest rate benchmarks and found that upon adopting 
the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol, the average 
country in their analysis would aggregately save between $7.6 
billion and $11.1 billion over a twenty-year period.97  They further 
estimated that countries that ratified and implemented the Cape 
Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol would save between 
thirteen and twenty percent per dollar of principal borrowed on 
interest.98  Professor Linestsky also conducted a statistical analysis 
and concluded that shorter repossession delays due to the Cape 
Town Convention could reduce the loss-given-default to a creditor 
on an aircraft loan by twenty-five to thirty percent.99  He estimated 
that such a risk reduction would result in risk spreads for airlines, 
with airlines with low credit ratings benefiting the most.100  He 
further concluded that borrowers with below a BBB- rating would 
experience between a one and two notch credit rating upgrade, 
which parallels the upgrade benefits witnessed in the United States 
following the enactment of Bankruptcy Code § 1110 due to the 
protections it provides to creditors.101 
All of these statistics sound good on paper, but it is still 
uncertain how the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol 
will affect the markets in practice as there have not been many 
cases of default generally, and even fewer that have gone to court. 
The Kingfisher incident is an exception.  Following several late 
and non-payment of dues, the Indian Directorate General of Civil 
Aviation (“DGCA”) suspended Kingfisher Airlines’ license to 
continue operations in 2013102 and, despite India’s ratification of 
                                                     
97 Id. at 30–31.  
98 Id. at 31.  
99 Vadim Linetsky, Economic Benefits of the Cape Town Treaty 2 (Oct. 18, 
2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.awg.aero/assets/docs/ 
economicbenefitsofCapeTown.pdf. 
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 13.  
102 Anindya Upadhyay, Govt Scraps Kingfisher’s Local Slots, International Flying 
Rights, ECON. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2013), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
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the Cape Town Convention in 2008, tax authorities impounded 
some of the aircraft103 and the DGCA refused to deregister certain 
aircraft.104  Germany’s DVB Bank, the world’s largest aircraft 
financier, filed suit against the DGCA and Kingfisher Airlines, 
demanding that two of its planes be deregistered.105  Prior to the 
DVB Aviation Finance judgment, issued on April 8, 2013,106 there 
was some skepticism regarding if and how the Delhi High Court 
would apply the Cape Town Convention, as the two aircraft in 
question were financed before India ratified the Cape Town 
Convention107 and thus it was unclear whether the court would 
find the treaty to apply retroactively to transactions.  This 
skepticism was apparently well founded as the Indian court did 
not so much as mention the Cape Town Convention in its opinion.  
However, in what may be viewed as a pragmatic judgment, the 
Delhi High Court did issue a writ of mandamus ordering the 
DGCA to de-register the aircraft and Kingfisher Airlines to furnish 
all necessary documents to DVB.108 
However, even this small victory for the Indian aircraft 
financing market may be short-lived as a subsequent appeal of a 
separate, but factually similar, case completely disregarded an 
aircraft lessor’s arguments for the application of the Cape Town 
Convention and instead issued an unfavorable judgment based on 
                                                     
news/news-by-industry/transportation/airlines-/-aviation/govt-scraps-
kingfishers-local-slots-international-flying-rights/articleshow_opt/18675785.cms.   
103 See Disha Kanwar, ILFC Wants Aircraft Returned, BUS. STANDARD (Dec. 21, 
2012), http://www.business-standard.com/article/companies/ilfc-wants-
aircraft-returned-112122100120_1.html (quoting a civil aviation ministry official as 
saying, “[w]e will talk to tax authorities as . . . [the] Central Board of Excise and 
Customs can’t impound planes leased to Kingfisher under the Cape Town 
convention”). 
104 Andrea Rothman & Karthikeyan Sundaram, ILFC Says Six Airbus A320s of 
Kingfisher ‘Held Hostage,’ BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2013, 9:11 AM), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-22/ilfc-says-six-airbus-a320s-of-kingfisher-
held-hostage-.html. 
105 Satish John & Anindya Upadhyay, DVB Bank, World’s Largest Aircraft 
Financier Drags DGCA to Court, ECON. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012, 4:24 AM), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-12-
20/news/35933822_1_dvb-bank-aircraft-kingfisher-airlines. 
106 DVB Aviation Finance Asia PTE Ltd. v. Directorate General of Civil 
Aviation, W.P. (C) 7661/2012 & CM No. 4208/2013 (Apr. 8, 2013) (Del.) [India], 
available at http://delhihighcourt.nic.in/dhcqrydisp_o.asp?pn=70783&yr=2013. 
107 Rothman & Sundaram, supra note 104. 
108 DVB Aviation, CM No. 4208/2013, ¶ 11. 
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domestic laws.  In Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Corporate Air 
Craft Funding Co. LLC, published May 10, 2013, the court held that 
the original jurisdiction judge had “erroneously issue[d] a Writ of 
Mandamus directing DGCA to de-register the aircraft” and stated 
that under domestic law “[n]ormally a Court would not direct a 
statutory authority [such as the DGCA] to exercise its discretion in 
a particular manner.”109  The court then left it up to the DGCA to 
make a “reasoned decision” of whether or not to de-register the 
aircraft within four weeks of the lessor making written submission 
to support its application for de-registration.110  Not only is the 
court further slowing down what should be a speedy process111 by 
giving the DGCA an additional four weeks to resolve an already 
prolonged issue (the aircraft under dispute had been grounded for 
the past three years), but by blatantly refusing to address the 
lessor’s arguments regarding the applicability of the Cape Town 
Convention the court created additional risks and costs for the 
aircraft finance market as a whole. 
India’s to-date in-adherence to the Cape Town Convention has 
drastically hurt its budding airline industry by scaring off future 
and current investors.  Experts have recently reported that aircraft 
lessors are now “demand[ing] a premium to cover risks” in India 
and that they are “insisting on a one-year security deposit instead 
of the usual three-month cover in addition to a commitment to hire 
the aircraft for as long as nine years.”112  These costs are being felt 
directly by various Indian airlines.  Jet Airways, one of India’s 
main airlines, witnessed a jump of thirty-one percent in aircraft 
                                                     
109 Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Corporate Air Craft Funding Co., 
LPA 226/2013 ¶ 22 (May 10, 2013) (Del.) [India]. 
110 Id. ¶ 24. 
111 It is interesting to compare this three-year long process of aircraft de-
registration in India with a much speedier process that occurred with regard to 
the Hungarian flagship carrier Malév which bankrupted in 2012.  Although 
Hungary is not a party to the Cape Town Convention, Malév Airlines 
nevertheless upheld agreement terms requiring speedy relief for its main lessor, 
U.S.-based International Lease Finance Corporation, by beginning to return its 
fleet of aircraft to the lessor within hours of the airline’s announcement of its 
dissolution.  See rkinga, Malév Aircraft Find New Home in Ireland, BUDAPEST TIMES 
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://budapesttimes.hu/2012/02/10/malev-aircraft-find-new-
home-in-ireland/.  
112 Karthikeyan Sundaram, Kingfisher Default Said to Raise Airline Costs: 
Corporate India, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 20, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2013-09-19/kingfisher-default-said-to-raise-airline-costs-corporate-
india.html. 
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leasing costs for its June 30, 2013 quarter, as compared to the 
previous year’s costs, and SpiceJet Ltd. witnessed a sixteen percent 
jump for the same period.113  The Indian government is now 
considering easing some of its rules and policies to “ensure leasing 
companies are able to take possession of aircraft without any 
hurdles” and to “underscor[e] the supremacy of the Cape Town 
Convention over Indian laws.”114 
4.2. Case Study of the United Arab Emirates 
4.2.1. The Legal Framework 
The United Arab Emirates’ (the “UAE”) domestic legal 
framework regarding aircraft financing, creditors’ rights, and 
bankruptcy are still being developed.  This situation makes the 
UAE a prime country to study to see effects of the treaty.  The 
UAE’s securities and bankruptcy legal structure is primarily 
governed by the UAE Federal Commercial Transactions Law No. 
18 of 1993 (Commercial Transactions Law) and the UAE 
Companies Law No. 8 of 1984 (Commercial Companies Law).  
Both of these laws are relatively untested, as many companies 
settle creditor claims out of court,115 and thus a lot of uncertainty 
remains regarding legal interpretation and processes, including 
how long proceedings may take and how the court will exercise its 
discretion.  In addition to this uncertainty, creditors may also have 
reason to be wary as the World Bank ranked the UAE 101st 
globally in terms of ease of recovering debt and noted that the 
recovery rate was only 29.4 cents on the U.S. dollar.116  The UAE 
has been working since 2009 to revise its outdated insolvency laws 
and to make the legal environment friendlier to both debtors and 
creditors.117  The Ministry of Finance finally submitted a completed 
draft to the legislative council in December 2013, but it is unclear 
                                                     
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115  UAE Bankruptcy Law Draft May be Delayed Until End 2013, REUTERS (Dec. 5 
2012, 8:25 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/05/emirates-
bankruptcy-idUSL5E8N54WC20121205. 
116 Tom Arnold, Bankruptcy Law to Bring FDI Boost, THE NATIONAL, Feb. 1 
2013, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/industry-insights/ 
economics/bankruptcy-law-to-bring-fdi-boost. 
117 UAE Bankruptcy Law Draft, supra note 114. 
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how long the council will review the draft and when or if it will be 
enacted.118 
Not only do creditors experience difficulties generally, but 
aircraft financing presents its own unique problems because UAE 
law does not directly address either “the creation of mortgages 
over aircraft or the creation of a separate register of mortgages or 
other rights over aircraft.”119  Despite this, lawyers have asserted 
that because “UAE law does classify an aircraft as a ‘movable asset’ 
and since the Commercial Code specifically provides for 
mortgages over movable assets, the generally accepted (although 
untested) view is that it is possible to create a valid security interest 
over an aircraft”120 if certain requirements are met.  Additionally, 
although the UAE’s General Civil Aviation Council does accept 
original copies of aircraft mortgages and keeps them on file, it does 
not have a public searchable registry for mortgages or other 
security interests in aircraft, making it difficult for potential 
creditors to determine priority interests in the aircraft.121  
Furthermore, the UAE General Civil Aviation Council had a 
historic practice of issuing letters of undertaking that it would not 
de-register or sell an aircraft without “the consent of certain 
specified parties, such as the owner, the lessor or a mortgagee.”122  
This practice exposed creditors, holding aircraft mortgages 
registered with the General Civil Aviation Council, to the risk that 
in an event of default they may be blocked from de-registering or 
selling the aircraft if a specified party withheld its consent or if 
there was an on-going dispute regarding the aircraft.123  Finally, 
UAE law does not dictate priority rankings for competing security 
                                                     
118 John Everington, UAE Makes Progress on New Insolvency Laws, THE 
NATIONAL, Dec. 21, 2013, http://www.thenational.ae/business/industry-
insights/economics/uae-makes-progress-on-new-insolvency-laws. 
119 Peter Caley, The United Arab Emirates and the Cape Town Convention, 
AIRFINANCE J., Mar. 2009, at 1, 1. 
120 Id. (emphasis added).  See also Civil Aviation Law, Fed. Law No. 20 of 1991 
art. 5(1) (UAE) (“An aircraft is movable property . . . .”); Commercial Transactions 
Law, Fed. Law No. 18 of 1993 art. 164 (UAE) (“A commercial mortgage is that 
which is contracted on movable property in security of a commercial debt.”). 
121 Caley, supra note 118, at 2. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
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interests, leaving creditors uncertain as to whether they would 
actually be able to recover their claim.124 
Following the UAE’s ratification of the Cape Town Convention 
and Aircraft Protocol on August 1, 2008,125 some of these issues 
have been resolved.  For instance, creditors can now register their 
security interests in aircraft in the International Registry126 and 
search the International Registry for prior claims.127  The Cape 
Town Convention assures creditors that their registered interest 
has “priority over any other interest subsequently registered and 
over an unregistered interest.”128  However, creditors should bear 
in mind that some non-consensual rights or interests may still take 
precedence over their interests such as “liens in favour of airlines 
workers for unpaid wages . . . ; liens . . . relating to unpaid taxes . . . 
[; and] liens in favour of repairers of an [aircraft].”129  Concerning 
the de-registration issue, the UAE made a declaration pursuant to 
Article XXX(1) of the Aircraft Protocol130 meaning that the General 
Civil Aviation Council will now, in principle, de-register an aircraft 
immediately if an Irrevocable De-Registration and Export Request 
Authorisation (“IDERA”) regarding that aircraft has been filed 
with it.  De-registration would be allowed regardless of whether 
there was an on-going dispute over the aircraft, which is contrary 
to previous UAE law.131  Despite all of these elucidations, it is still 
unclear how quickly a creditor would be able to exercise his 
remedies under the Cape Town Convention, as the UAE declared 
that any available remedies may only be exercised with leave of the 
court.132 
                                                     
124 Id.  
125 See supra notes 4 and 5 and accompanying texts. 
126 Cape Town Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 18–20. 
127 Id. at art. 22. 
128 Id. at art. 29(1). 
129 Declarations Lodged by the United Arab Emirates Under the Cape Town 
Convention at the Time of the Deposit of its Instrument of Accession in Respect 
Thereof, Form No. 1 (Specific Opt-in Declarations Under Article 39(1)(a)), Aug. 1, 
2008, available at http://www.unidroit.org/component/content/article?id 
=494:declarations-lodged-by-the-united-arab-emirates-under-the-cape-town-
convention-at-the-time-of-the-deposit-of-its-instrument-of-accession-in-respect-
thereof [hereinafter Declarations].  
130 UNIDROIT Status of the Protocol, supra note 5. 
131 Caley, supra note 118, at 2. 
132 Declarations, supra note 128. 
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The UAE also adopted Alternative A of the Aircraft Protocol 
and set the waiting period to sixty days.133  Alternative A states 
that upon an insolvency-related event the creditor or lessor will 
either be given possession of the aircraft or all obligations 
regarding it will settled no later than the end of the waiting 
period.134  Alternative A and the UAE’s sixty day waiting period 
were based on and are substantially similar to § 1110 of the U.S. 
Federal Bankruptcy Code.135  However, Alternative A, as applied 
in the UAE, is still untested, and thus it remains unclear whether it 
truly will be implemented in the same manner as U.S. § 1110. 
4.2.2. Airlines and Financing 
The UAE has two major airlines—Etihad, which was founded 
in 2003 and is owned by the government of Abu Dhabi,136 and 
Emirates, which began in 1985 and is owned by the government of 
Dubai—and a few smaller airlines.137  The Cape Town Convention 
and Aircraft Protocol entered into force in the UAE August 1, 
2008.138  That same year, Etihad executives attended the 
Farnborough International Air Show and placed the largest aircraft 
order in aviation history at that time, with 100 firm orders, 55 
options, and 50 purchase rights.139  In 2008, Etihad only had 42 
aircraft.140  It now has 83 aircraft with 76 more deliveries 
                                                     
133 Id.  Alternative A is the stronger and less discretionary of the two options 
and provides the creditor and the airline with “a clear timetable during which 
they can negotiate the return or retention of the aircraft.”  Jeffrey Wool & Andrew 
Littlejohns, Cape Town Treaty in the European Context: The Case for Alternative A, 
Article XI of the Aircraft Protocol, AIRFINANCE ANNUAL, 2007/2008, at 1, 1, available at 
http://www.awg.aero/assets/docs/capetowntreatyinthe%20europeancontext.pd
f.  
134 Aircraft Protocol, supra note 3, at art. XI. 
135 See 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006) (granting a secured party “the right to take 
possession [of the aircraft] and to enforce [its] other rights and remedies” if the 
debt obligation is not cured within 60 days). 
136 About Us, ETIHAD AIRWAYS, http://www.etihadairways.com/en-
us/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
137 The Emirates Story, EMIRATES, http://www.emirates.com/us/english 
/about/the_emirates_story.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
138 UNIDROIT Status of the Protocol, supra note 5. 
139 Our Story: Our History, ETIHAD AIRWAYS, http://www.etihad.com/en/ 
about-us/our-story/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2014). 
140 Facts and Figures, ETIHAD AIRWAYS, Issue 7, Sept. 2009, at 1, 8, available at 
http://www.etihadmediacentre.com/assets/89327434/files/Corporate_Facts_an
d_figures-English.pdf. 
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anticipated by 2020.141  Etihad’s large order was strategically 
placed at a time when it would be able to take advantage of the 
U.S. Export-Import Bank’s reduced fee reduction.  Although there 
have been many accusations that Etihad, along with the other UAE 
national carriers, receives subsidies and sovereign guarantees from 
their local governments, Etihad CEO James Hogan affirms that the 
airline raises debt entirely on its own, including from the U.S. 
Export-Import Bank and a syndicate of forty other banks.142 
Emirates Airlines was less fortunate in terms of taking 
advantage of the U.S. Export-Import Bank’s self-imposed fee 
reduction incentive as it had just placed a large order in 2007,143 
and its subsequent large order in 2010 occurred after the Export-
Import Bank’s self-imposed fee reduction incentive lapsed.144  
Furthermore, the UAE has not fully complied with all of the ASU 
requirements that would allow it to receive the premium rate 
reductions post-2010;145 Emirates was thus unable to take 
advantage of that perk as well.  However, just because Emirates 
has not benefited from these ‘advertised’ perks does not mean it 
has not benefited from the UAE being a party to the Cape Town 
Convention and Aircraft Protocol. 
                                                     
141 ETIHAD AIRWAYS, FAST FACTS AND FIGURES Q3/2013, at 4 (2013), available at 
http://www.etihad.com/Documents/PDFs/Corporate%20profile/Fast%20facts/
Q3-2013-en.pdf. 
142 See Cathy Buyck, Interview: Etihad CEO James Hogan, AIR TRANSPORT 
WORLD  (Jan. 1, 2012), http://atwonline.com/airline-finance-data/article/ 
interview-etihad-ceo-james-hogan-0103 (quoting CEO James Hogan as stating 
“we don’t get any form of subsidy; we get no letters of comfort or sovereign 
guarantees and we have to raise debt ourselves,” and “only 15% of Etihad’s 
aircraft financing is sourced from export credit guarantees, with the remainder 
financed in the commercial, leasing and Islamic markets”). 
143 See Terry Maxon, Emirates Places a Really Big Airplane Order, DALLAS NEWS 
BUS. (Nov. 11, 2007, 10:57 AM), http://aviationblog.dallasnews.com/ 
2007/11/emirates-places-a-really-big-a.html/ (noting that Emirates Airlines 
signed contracts to purchase “$34.9 billion MSRP worth of airplanes” in 2007). 
144 See Alex Delmar-Morgan, Boeing Snares Huge Jet Order, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 
13, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204323904577035 
442261606210.html (reporting that Emirates placed the “largest commercial 
aircraft order in Boeing Co.’s history” in 2010).  
145 Aircraft Sector Understanding: Cape Town Convention (CTC) Contracting 
Parties Qualifying for a CTC Discount, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/ 
tad/exportcredits/ctc.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012) (explaining that the 
“Aircraft Sector Understanding (ASU) provides for a discount from the minimum 
premium rate in the case a state fulfills [certain] conditions,” and listing the states 
that qualify for the Cape Town Convention discount).  
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In 2012, Emirates closed a deal to lease four new Airbus A380-
861s from Doric Nimrod Air Finance Alpha Limited.146  Doric 
Alpha in turn needed financing to purchase those planes and 
successfully issued the first non-U.S. airline Enhanced Equipment 
Trust Certificates (“EETC”).  This EETC was also the first of its 
kind to rely on the Cape Town Convention as opposed to § 1110 of 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.147  EETCs are multi-tranche certificates, 
or bonds, issued by a trustee to investors.148  Each tranche has a 
different risk-reward profile, with the senior certificates receiving a 
much higher credit rating.149  The funds raised are used to buy the 
aircraft, which is then leased to the airline that ordered it.150  Doric 
Alpha issued Class A and Class B Pass Through Certificates which 
Moody’s rated as A3 and Baa3 respectively.151 
Moody’s considered five things in its assessment: 
(i) the credit quality of the Lessee, Emirates; (ii) Moody’s 
opinion of the collateral protection of the Notes; (iii) the 
applicability of the Cape Town Convention . . . ; (iv) the 
credit support provided by the liquidity facilities; and (v) 
certain favorable characteristics of the Notes.152 
Moody’s approvingly noted that the operating leases and 
equipment notes would be subject to the Cape Town Convention, 
yet it expressed concern over the absence of precedent for 
enforcement actions brought under the Convention in the UAE.153  
                                                     
146 Global Credit Research, Rating Action: Moody’s Assigns A3 Rating to A-
tranche of Doric Nimrod Air Finance Alpha’s 2012-1 EETC, MOODY’S INVESTORS 
SERVICE (Jun. 21, 2012), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-assigns-A3-
rating-to-A-tranche-of-Doric-Nimrod--PR_248921. 
147 Press Release, DORIC, Award for Doric Alpha EETC (Jan. 29, 2013), 
available at http://www.doric.com/fileadmin/Doric_Asset_Finance/Press_ 
Releases/130129_doric_pressrelease_EETC_award.pdf. 
148 See PETER S. MORRELL, AIRLINE FINANCE 212 (3rd ed. 2007) (defining and 
explaining the nature of EETCs).   
149 Global Credit Research, supra note 145. 
150 Id. 
151 Id.  The magazine Airline Economics noted that, “the A tranche was 
awarded with the highest rating post-financial crisis to any EETC, [so] Moody’s 
must have been confident in the quality of the lessee [Emirates] and the extent of 
the airline’s disclosure.” Victoria Tozer-Pennington, No Limits, AIRLINE ECON., 
Sept.–Oct. 2012, at 20, 22. 
152 Global Credit Research, supra note 145. 
153 Id. 
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However, after diligent consultation and analysis, Moody’s 
extrapolated that Doric Alpha would be able to recover the aircraft 
in the event of default, mainly because of Dubai law’s general 
respect for property rights.154  This perception was largely based on 
a Clifford Chance legal opinion that “shows that . . . Alternative A 
of the Protocol is good and effective law in the UAE.”155  The 
Clifford Chance opinion also assured Moody’s and investors that  
although many aspects of Cape Town have not yet been 
tested in the UAE, there are other elements of Cape Town 
that have, such as the implementation of the use of IDERAs 
by theGeneral Civil Aviation Authority in the UAE.  
Moreover, the fact that the UAE has adopted other 
international conventions, such as the Montreal 
Convention, in a manner that was applied consistently with 
the actual wording of the law as adopted in the UAE, 
showed precedent that the UAE has been true to its 
word.156 
Moody’s further analogized Dubai’s potential future treatment 
of the Cape Town Convention to its treatment of the Dubai World 
restructuring and expressed its opinion that Dubai had adopted 
the Convention in good faith.157   
Dubai World is the main investment vehicle for the emirate of 
Dubai.  With the drastic fall in property values during 2009, Dubai 
World requested a six-month standstill from all creditors regarding 
its $26 billion debt.158  Some feared that this delay could lead to the 
largest government default since the 2001 Argentine debt crisis.159  
However, these fears were eventually assuaged when the Dubai 
government expressed its “keen interest . . . in preserving the 
                                                     
154 Id. 
155 Tozer-Pennington, supra note 150, at 24. 
156 Id.  
157 Global Credit Research, supra note 145. 
158 Dubai World Announces Restructuring Plans, GULFNEWS.COM (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://gulfnews.com/business/general/dubai-world-announces-restructuring-
plans-1.542850. 
159 Could Dubai World’s Debt Default Spark a Crisis in the Middle East and 
Beyond?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Dec. 9, 2009), 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2399.  
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rights of Dubai World creditors”160 and issued Decree No. 57 of 
2009, creating new insolvency regulations specifically for a Dubai 
World restructuring based on the laws of the Dubai International 
Financial Center and elements of U.S. Chapter 11.161  Decree No. 57 
of 2009 effectively eliminated a lot of the precedential uncertainty 
of UAE federal laws No. 18 of 1993 and No. 8 of 1984 and also 
offered much more favorable terms to Dubai World’s creditors.  
This swift change in law represents the UAE’s commitment to 
fostering an environment capable of attracting investors and 
suggests that, were Emirates to default, its creditors would still be 
treated well, without the hassle that DVB and other aircraft lessors 
have experienced in trying to recover their investments from India.   
The capital markets do indeed view ratification of the Cape 
Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol as risk-mitigating factors 
and are accounting for that in credit ratings and interest rates.   
That is why the A tranche for the Doric Alpha and Emirates’ 2012 
deal received the highest of any EETC ratings post-financial 
crisis162 and why the transaction was three times oversubscribed.163  
A year later, Doric Alpha and Emirates were able to secure an 
equally favorable credit rating for the acquisition of four more 
aircraft based on a similar Moody’s analysis.164  
5. CONCLUSION 
Even with the recent recession, it still seems that more 
companies have cheaper and easier access to aircraft financing.  
The Cape Town Convention seems to be having a 
disproportionately positive effect on emerging market Member 
States,165 where the demand for aircraft is increasing at a steeper 
                                                     
160 Special Court for Dubai World Disputes, KHALEEJ TIMES (Dec. 14, 2009), 
http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle09.asp?xfile=data/theuae/2009/D
ecember/theuae_December395.xml&section=theuae. 
161 Bankruptcy and Corporate Rescue in the UAE: Overview and Observations, 
LINKLATERS (July 15, 2010), http://www.linklaters.com/Publications/ 
Publication2051Newsletter/20100708/Pages/Bankruptcyandcorporaterescue.asp
x.  
162 Tozer-Pennington, supra note 150, at 22. 
163 Tozer-Pennington, supra note 150, at 20. 
164 Rating Action: Moody’s Rates DNA Alpha’s EETC, Class A at A3, Class B at 
Baa3, MOODY’S (June 24, 2013), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-
rates-DNA-Alphas-EETC-Class-A-at-A3-Class--PR_275801. 
165 See generally Saunders et al., supra note 16.  
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rate and where the access to capital has been historically lower.  
The UAE in particular ratified the treaty just prior to placing one of 
the largest orders in aviation history, allowing Etihad to take 
advantage of the lower-cost debt.166  Emirates has also successfully 
participated in the issuance of the first non-U.S. airline EETCs, 
largely due to the Cape Town Convention.  Concerns regarding 
how local courts will interpret and uphold the treaty are becoming 
more imminent, as evidenced by the increasing costs to Indian 
airlines of aircraft leasing.  However, this does not seem to toll the 
failure of Cape Town.  Jamie Bullen, a senior reporter for the 
Airfinance Journal, noted that “peer pressure, potential loss of 
cheaper export credit financing and conventions in leases and 
financing . . . may make this less of an issue for many in the 
industry.”167  Other countries have observed the Kingfisher fiasco 
and are well aware of the consequences of not abiding by treaty’s 
terms.  India itself has begun considering legal reforms to ensure 
more forceful implementation of the treaty and that its terms 
supersede domestic laws.  As more countries ratify and implement 
the Cape Town Convention and Aircraft Protocol, there will likely 
be an enormous cost savings at the world level, benefiting aircraft 
manufacturers with higher sales, airlines with cheaper debt to buy 
and lease aircraft, and the common passenger with increased 
ability to travel.  
                                                     
166 See Etihad Places Order for up to 205 Aircraft, ETIHAD AIRWAYS (July 14, 
2008), http://www.etihadmediacentre.com/file.php?f_ID=555. 
167 Jamie Bullen, Cape Town’s Momentum, AIRFINANCE J., Issue 256, Nov. 2012, 
at 248, 248. 
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